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Between continuation and adaptation:  
The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces
Piotr Szymański
The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian mi-
litary activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own 
military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO 
step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security 
policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in de-
fence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces 
, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction 
of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their 
military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithu-
ania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is 
the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will de-
pend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
The evolution of the Baltic states’ security and defence policies
In the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Estonia had to face the challenge 
of defining the foundations of their security pol-
icies and building up their defence capabilities. 
In the first half of the 1990s the Baltic states 
considered three directions of security policy: 
(a) neutrality or non-aligned status; (b) a trilat-
eral alliance (in close military co-operation with 
the Nordic states); (c) aspirations to join NATO 
and the EU1. The former two options were seen 
as a temporary alternative to the security guar-
antees that NATO could offer, because at that 
time the Baltic states’ room for manoeuvre was 
limited by the Russian troops still stationed on 
their territories (until 1993 and 1994). The Baltic 
states’ foreign policy at that time was built on 
a positive image of the West and a negative im-
1 G. Miniotaitė, ‘Lithuania’s Evolving Security and Defence 
Policy: Problems and Prospects’, in R. Lopata, J. Novag-
rockienè, G. Vitkus (ed.), Lithuanian Annual Strategic Re-
view 2006, Military Academy of Lithuania 2007, p. 179.
age of Russia. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia saw 
Russia as a threat to their sovereignty and na-
tional identity2. Their fears of Russian revision-
ism and possible moves to incorporate them into 
the Russian sphere of influence were rooted in 
the experience of 50 years of occupation, as well 
as the presence of Russian-speaking minorities. 
These fears were fuelled by Russia’s moves to 
prevent the Baltic states from integrating with 
the West (which included the threat or use of 
force, provocations, economic pressure, and 
allegations concerning violations of the rights 
of Russian-speaking minorities)3. In view of all 
this, in the mid-1990s the Baltic states identi-
fied membership in NATO and the EU as their 
2 J. Kozakiewicz, ‘Polityka bezpieczeństwa państw bałty-
ckich’ [Security policy of the Baltic states], Instytut 
Studiów Strategicznych, Kraków 2003, p. 105-247.
3 The Russians sought to have the withdrawal of their 
troops from the Baltic states linked with the question of 
respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities 
in Latvia and Estonia. 
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foreign and security policy objective (by joining 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and 
signing Association Agreements with the EU).
When they regained independence, the Baltic 
states had no armed forces of their own. The cre-
ation of armed forces, which began in the years 
1990–1991, became an important element of 
the reconstruction of their statehood. Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia had to build the structures of 
individual military branches from scratch, and the 
same goes for military commands, training and 
education systems as well as defence ministries. 
In the 1990s the Baltic states, like much of Eu-
rope at that time, developed their armed forces 
according to a conscription-based model with 
a large reserve base, complemented by volunteer 
territorial defence forces (TDF). They co-operat-
ed with many countries in terms of the acquisi-
tions of armament and military equipment, troop 
training and the implementation of NATO stan-
dards, including in particular the Nordic states, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Israel. This resulted in the 
procurement of disparate types of military equip-
ment (transferred or sold on preferential terms), 
impediments to trilateral military co-operation 
and development of different strategic cultures4.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became NATO mem-
bers in 2004. Once they obtained the Alliance’s 
guarantees, their sense of security improved 
considerably: in their strategic documents, the 
three states considered a scenario of direct mil-
itary aggression against any of them to be unre-
4 Despite obstacles, since the mid-1990s the Baltic states 
have been developing trilateral military co-operation. 
This includes preparations to participation in foreign 
missions (BALTBAT), airspace surveillance (BALTNET), 
mine countermeasures (BALTRON) and military educa-
tion (BALTDEFCOL).
alistic5. Lithuania and Latvia, and to some extent 
Estonia, complied with the doctrine in force in 
NATO, which emphasised out-of-area operations, 
and the Baltic states stepped up their involve-
ment in foreign missions (since the mid-1990s 
they have taken part in several UN operations in 
the Balkans and the Middle East, usually as part 
of Danish contingents). A real test for Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia came with their involvement 
in the NATO/USA expeditionary operations in 
2003–2014 in Afghanistan (NATO’s ISAF) and Iraq 
(the USA’s Iraqi Freedom). In proportion to their 
demographic potential, the Baltic states made 
some of the greatest contributions among NATO 
members to foreign missions6. Their involvement 
defined the direction in which Lithuania and Lat-
via modernised their armed forces, which were 
professionalised (Latvia stopped conscription in 
2006 and Lithuania did so two years later), and 
developed their expeditionary potential at the ex-
pense of the capability to defend their own terri-
tories. In both countries the reforms also involved 
a downsizing of numbers of troops, reservists 
and territorial defence forces members (TDF in 
Lithuania were incorporated into the land force 
in 2003) and investments in the navy and special 
forces. Estonia adopted a more reserved stance 
with regard to the doctrine changes within NATO 
(while actively participating in foreign missions); 
it maintained a high mobilisation capacity, re-
tained conscription, and the principle of total 
defence, which envisaged the involvement or all 
military and civilian structures, as well as state in-
stitutions, in the defence of the state. 
5 E. Männik, ‘The Evolution of Baltic Security and Defence 
Strategies’, in T. Lawrence, T. Jermalavicius (ed.), Ap-
prenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of 
Defence Development in the Baltic States, p. 30. 
6 In Iraq, soldiers from the Baltic states served in three sec-
tors: the US central zone (an Estonian platoon), the Polish 
zone (a Lithuanian platoon and a Latvian company) and 
the British zone (a Lithuanian platoon). In Afghanistan suc-
cessive rotations of soldiers involved company-sized forc-
es. The Lithuanian contingent commanded the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Ghor, while 
the Latvian contingent was part of the Norwegian PRT in 
the Maymana province and the Estonian contingent served 
under British command in the Helmand province. P. Pal-
jak, ‘Participation In International Military Operations’, in T. 
Lawrence, T. Jermalavicius (ed.), op. cit., p. 224.
After regaining independence, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia started building their 
armed forces from scratch.
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The Baltic states have a small military potential 
and have no capability to independently en-
gage in the regular defence of their own ter-
ritory (see Appendix 1). This is mainly due to 
the small size of their armed forces and the fact 
that they are poorly equipped. In some areas, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are only starting 
to develop certain capabilities (e.g. the mech-
anisation of infantry in Latvia). Due to budget-
ary constraints, the Baltic states’ air forces do 
not have combat components (their tasks are 
limited to transport and training), and their 
land forces have no tanks. In foreign missions, 
they are capable of quickly deploying compa-
ny-sized land force units, special forces or sup-
porting maritime patrol and mine countermea-
sures operations. The land forces are the main 
military branch in the Baltic states (in each of 
them, an infantry brigade constitutes the core 
of the army), and possess limited anti-tank and 
air defence capabilities7.
The Baltics’ response to Crimea
The cyber-attack on Estonia (2007) and the Rus-
sian-Georgian war (2008) caused quite some 
concern in the Baltic states, as these events af-
fected their perceptions of potential threats. In 
their strategic documents from 2010–2012, the 
Baltic states devoted more attention to conven-
tional threats, the activity of other states’ intelli-
gence and cyber-security, noting Russia’s ambi-
tions to regain the status of a global power and 
the rising tensions between Russia and NATO8. In 
2012 Lithuania and Latvia announced that they 
would increase their defence spending to 2% of 
7 J. Gotkowska, O. Osica (ed.), ‘Closing the gap? Military 
co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea’, OSW 
Report, Warsaw 2012, p. 52-55, http://www.osw.waw.
pl/sites/default/files/closing_the_gap_net_0.pdf 
8 National Security Concept of Estonia (2010), http://www.
kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/basic-na-
tional-defence-documents; The National Security Concept 
of the Republic of Latvia (2011), State Defence Concept 
(Latvia, 2012), http://www.mod.gov.lv/Par_aizsardzibas_
nozari/Politikas_planosana/Koncepcijas.aspx; National se-
curity strategy (Lithuania, 2012), The Military Strategy Of 
the Republic of Lithuania (2012), http://www.kam.lt/en/
defence_policy_1053/important_documents.html 
GDP, but the financial crisis prevented them from 
carrying out these plans9. The annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014 triggered a public debate 
on security and defence policy in the Baltic states. 
Some politicians, military and experts started to 
see Russia as a direct threat to the Baltic states’ 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The poten-
tial crisis scenarios that were discussed included 
a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from con-
ventional aggression to unconventional threats 
such as information warfare, cyber-attacks, sab-
otage, the instigation of minority protests, up 
to economic pressure or even the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the Baltic states’ 
defence ministries have not ruled out the threat 
of armed aggression, but they consider it to be 
unlikely. In response to Russia’s activities, the 
Baltic states have stepped up efforts to increase 
their own military potential and to have NATO 
establish a permanent presence of allied forces 
on their territories. Lithuania has implemented 
the furthest-reaching changes in its armed forc-
es, followed by Latvia, while in Estonia a tenden-
cy towards continuation has prevailed. 
(1) Increased military spending. React-
ing to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, in 
2014 Lithuania and Latvia committed them-
selves to gradually increase their defence 
budgets to reach 2% of the GDP in 202010. 
These decisions were a step towards end-
ing the five-year period in which their armed 
forces were underfinanced (see Appendix 2). 
9 In the years 2007–2010 the defence budgets of the Bal-
tic states shrank by around 40% (in Latvia by over half 
in 2007–2012). The response of the Baltic states was also 
limited as a result of their commitments related to par-
ticipation in foreign missions.
10 Currently both governments are planning to accomplish 
this objective in the year 2018. In 2014 Lithuania spent 
0.8% of GDP on Defence, and Latvia 0.9% of GDP.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine 
triggered a public debate on security and 
defence policy in the Baltic states.
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Estonia has since 2012 maintained its de-
fence spending at the level of 2% of GDP, in 
compliance with NATO recommendations. In 
2015, the rate of economic growth in the Bal-
tic states enabled them to increase their de-
fence spending, which amounts to €425 mil-
lion in the case of Lithuania, €254 million in 
Latvia and €412 million in Estonia (up by 50%, 
14.9% and 7.3% respectively, compared to 
2014)11. This upward trend will continue in 2016. 
(2) Faster modernisation of the armed forces. 
Higher defence spending will enable the Baltic 
states to step up investments in new armament 
and military equipment, and reduce delays in the 
implementation of programmes to modernise 
the armed forces (including the mechanisation of 
infantry and the strengthening of the anti-tank, 
artillery and air defence potential). In 2014–2015 
the Baltic states acquired heavy equipment: Es-
tonia bought 44 CV-9035NL infantry fighting 
vehicles from the Netherlands, Latvia bought 
123 CVR(T) armoured vehicles from the United 
Kingdom, and Lithuania acquired 21 PzH 2000 
self-propelled howitzers from Germany. Con-
trary to the media narrative, those procurements 
were not a response to the annexation of Crimea, 
as preparations to make them had started many 
years before. However, the Lithuanian purchase 
of Polish GROM man-portable air-defence sys-
tems in 2014 (€37.6 million from non-budget 
funding) was a direct response to the events in 
Crimea. As Russia has been developing its ca-
11 ‘Media backgrounder, Military spending in Europe in 
the wake of the Ukraine crisis’, SIPRI, 13 April 2015, 
http://www.sipri.org/media/website-photos/milex-me-
dia-backgrounder-2015
pability to project power, the Baltic states have 
stepped up investments in reconnaissance, early 
warning systems and stronger airspace surveil-
lance. Latvia has decided to purchase three me-
dium-range TPS-77 Multi-Role Radars (MRR) in 
October 2015, to complement the three AN/TPS-
77 radars it already has in place12.
(3) Changes in the size, structure and train-
ing of the armed forces. In view of the man-
ning deficits in many military units, Lithuania 
and Latvia decided to increase the total number 
of troops. In May 2015 Lithuania reintroduced 
conscription for a period of five years (nine 
months of military service, with priority for vol-
unteers). The defence ministry is planning to 
train 3000 conscripts a year. This will enable it 
to increase the number of troops (to double the 
present number by 2021), rebuild the reserve 
system and form a second infantry brigade. The 
newly recruited soldiers will mainly be assigned 
to the Iron Wolf mechanised infantry brigade 
(to reach manning levels of 70–90% by 2020)13. 
In Latvia the Defence Ministry is planning to in-
crease the number of regular troops from 5300 
to 6000 in 2018, and the number of volunteer 
territorial defence forces  from 8000 to 12,000 
members (by 2020). Estonia has increased the 
number of personnel in the air force (from 250 
to 400) and the navy (from 200 to 300), and 
has been consistently developing its TDFs (from 
around 24,000 to 30,000 members in 2022).
As part of their reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, the Baltic states announced that they 
12 After 2016, three next-generation 3D long-range ra-
dars will be installed in Lithuania (funded by the NATO 
Communications and Information Agency and the 
NATO Support and Procurement Agency as part of the 
strengthening of the NATO Integrated Air Defence Sys-
tem), to replace the post-Soviet radars. Estonia has two 
Ground Master 403 long-range radars (purchased joint-
ly with Finland in 2009). 
13 ‘Number of professional soldiers in Lithuania to double 
over next five years’, The Baltic Times, 5 June 2015, http://
www.baltictimes.com/number_of_professional_soldiers_
in_lithuania_to_double_over_next_five_years/; Krašto ap-
saugos ministro 2015–2020 m. gairės (Guidelines of the 
Minister of National Defence 2015-2020), Ministry of Na-
tional Defence (Lithuania), 27 January 2015, http://www.
kam.lt/lt/veikla_576/planavimo_dokumentai_579.html 
In response to the annexation of Crimea, 
the Baltic states announced that they 
would raise the level of combat readiness 
of some military units in order to respond 
more rapidly to unconventional threats.
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would raise the level of combat readiness of 
some units in order to be able to respond more 
rapidly to unconventional threats (the seizure of 
public administration buildings, attacks against 
critical infrastructures, infiltration by armed 
groups across borders). Lithuania has been the 
most active in this regard. In 2014 it assigned 
2500 troops to a rapid reaction component of 
its armed forces (the two best-equipped battal-
ions of the land forces, 800 troops each, with 
air force and special force support and logistic 
backing). The Lithuanian Defence Ministry has 
stated that some units are ready for deploy-
ment within two hours of receiving orders14. 
Latvia has announced that it would raise the 
level of combat readiness of some parts of its 
territorial defence forces by 2018 (one company 
from each battalion, 18 in total). In Estonia, the 
TDF staff has been raising the number of mem-
bers who keep weapons at home (the target 
proportion is 70%). Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia have been investing in special forces, whose 
rapid reaction may prevent an escalation of 
conflict in the event of provocation or sabotage 
(without the need to involve regular troops). 
The Baltic states have also updated their mili-
tary exercise scenarios. These now include tasks 
concerning the prevention of unconvention-
al threats such as urban warfare, defence of 
critical infrastructures, co-operation with local 
authorities, airborne assault and elimination of 
saboteurs by special forces. The Baltic states 
have started testing some elements of partial 
mobilisation of reserves, as in the case of Esto-
nia’s Sill military exercise (May 2015), in which 
7000 reservists were called to participate.
(4) Development of military infrastructures. 
The Baltic states have increased investments in 
the development of military infrastructures and 
14 In 2014 Lithuania amended its law on the use of the mil-
itary force in peacetime. In certain cases, the president 
may authorise the use of the armed forces on the terri-
tory of Lithuania without seeking parliament’s approval; 
parliament may sustain or override that decision. The 
changes are intended to shorten the reaction times of 
the armed forces in the event of a domestic threat.
logistics (with support from NATO, especially 
the United States). They have done this in order 
to address their limited capacity to accept allied 
troops and equipment (Host Nation Support, 
HNS). Those limitations have constituted an 
important obstacle to the implementation of 
plans to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank, 
as agreed at the NATO summit in Newport 
(including an intensification of military drills). 
The main work included the modernisation of 
air bases (Šiauliai, Lielvārde, Ämari), military 
barracks and depots, and expansion of military 
training areas (Pabradė, Rukla, Ādaži, Kuusalu, 
Tapa)15. The conflict in Ukraine has led to an ac-
celeration of the implementation of key proj-
ects: the early opening of the air base in Ämari, 
Estonia, for the needs of the Baltic Air Policing 
mission (BAP, April 2014) is a case in point. 
Outlook for the future
(1) Prospects for the Baltic states’ security 
policy. In the aftermath of the annexation of 
Crimea, the Baltic states will build up the po-
tential of their armed forces in order to increase 
capacity to defend their own territories, while 
seeking a strengthening of collective defence 
within NATO. At the same time Lithuania, Lat-
via and Estonia will be unable to give up their 
participation in foreign missions. Their involve-
ment in out-of-area operations strengthens 
their position within the Alliance, and enables 
them to build up their image as reliable al-
15 In 2015 Estonia allocated around €40 million (to 2019) 
to HNS, and subsequently decided to create a new train-
ing area in Soodla (for the needs of the newly-purchased 
infantry fighting vehicles).
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been in-
vesting in the development of their military 
infrastructures and logistics in order to im-
prove their ability to host allied support.
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lies (especially in the relations with the USA). 
Since no large NATO operations are currently 
underway, the Estonian platoon taking part in 
the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon is at this moment 
the largest foreign contingent currently de-
ployed by a Baltic state. In view of the Ukrainian 
conflict, the Baltic states will seek closer mili-
tary co-operation with the United States, which 
they see as their key ally and guarantor of se-
curity. The Baltic states will also seek greater 
military presence of European NATO members.
The main objective of Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia at NATO’s Warsaw summit  (July 2016) will be 
to obtain guarantees of the permanent presence 
of allied forces on their territory. In May 2015 the 
commanders-in-chief of the Baltic states’ armed 
forces called on the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe to deploy brigade-sized 
forces on the territories of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia (one battalion per country). At present, 
the United States provides a persistent rotation-
al presence in the Baltic states as part of the At-
lantic Resolve operation (one company in each 
of the Baltic states). Germany and the United 
Kingdom have committed themselves to de-
ploying rotational forces in the Baltic states and 
Poland for longer periods and on a regular ba-
sis16. Meanwhile, the European allies have been 
deploying rotational forces on an ad hoc basis, 
for one- or two-month drills17. Since there are no 
16 In 2015 Germany deployed 220 soldiers to Lithuania for 
three months (April-July) and 260 soldiers to Latvia for 
three months (August-November). In October 2015 the 
United Kingdom announced that it would send one rota-
tional company (around 100 soldiers) to the Baltic states 
and Poland (three-month exercise cycles in each country).
17 So far served by Hungary, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium 
(together with Luxembourg) with around 140–270 soldiers. 
plans to establish any permanent NATO bases in 
the Baltic states, the latter will seek the estab-
lishment of a schedule of continuous rotations 
of land forces contingents modelled on the BAP 
mission, to ensure a persistent presence of forc-
es larger than the single companies from the US 
deployments. Moreover, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia are in advanced talks with the United 
States concerning the pre-positioning of several 
hundred items of US military equipment (includ-
ing tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-pro-
pelled howitzers). The pre-positioning will begin 
in December 2015. Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia have declared that NATO Force Integration 
Units (NFIU), tasked with co-ordinating Host 
Nation Support, will become fully operational 
in the first half of 2016. It is also important for 
the Baltic states to ensure that NATO continues 
to financially support the development of their 
military infrastructures and the strengthening 
of airspace surveillance, and maintains the rein-
forced BAP mission (which consists of 8 fighters 
at present). 
The sense of threat from Russia will contribute 
to a stepping-up of trilateral military co-opera-
tion between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, al-
beit only to a limited extent. On the one hand, 
the Baltic states have been developing closer 
co-operation in some areas, such as cyber-se-
curity, information sharing and HNS exercises, 
and in 2016 a joint battalion of the Baltic states 
(BALTBAT, intended for peacekeeping opera-
tions) will come on duty as part of the NATO 
Response Force. On the other hand, however, 
the financial shortages and disparate priorities 
according to which individual Baltic countries 
have been developing their armed forces, and 
in some case also their mutual distrust, will 
limit the scope for co-operation between Lith-
uania, Latvia and Estonia. The withdrawal of 
Estonia from the BALTRON joint mine counter-
measures squadron in January 2015 is a case 
in point. Co-operation in co-ordinating the 
three states’ armed forces modernisation pro-
grammes and joint acquisitions of armament 
At the NATO summit in Warsaw, the Bal-
tic states will seek to obtain guarantees 
of a permanent allied military presence on 
their territory.
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and military equipment is lacking, as demon-
strated by the tendering procedures now in 
progress. The Baltic states have been mechanis-
ing their infantries in co-operation with differ-
ent Western partners, who offer different types 
of armoured vehicles. They have also made sep-
arate acquisitions of man-portable air-defence 
systems and other types of equipment. The 
only exception is the purchase of ammunition 
for the Carl Gustav recoilless rifles jointly with 
Poland and the Czech Republic (via the Europe-
an Defence Agency). 
(2) Development of the Baltic states’ armed 
forces. Even with considerably increased de-
fence expenditures, purchases of armament 
and military equipment and the recruitment of 
new soldiers, the Baltic states will not be able 
to fully compensate for the negative changes 
in their security environment. Therefore, the 
efforts to strengthen the conventional poten-
tial of the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia will be complemented in the coming 
years by measures to improve these countries’ 
ability to host allied support and enhance their 
reconnaissance and early warning capabilities. 
At the same time, the Baltic states will focus on 
preventing unconventional threats. As a result, 
the importance of special forces will increase, 
insofar as they are capable of delivering an im-
mediate response to crisis situations. 
The dynamics of change within the Baltic 
states’ armed forces will largely depend on the 
economic situation, which will in turn deter-
mine the size of defence budgets. Demograph-
ic trends (ongoing depopulation) will also be 
an important factor, limiting the Baltic states’ 
ability to man their military units. Some of the 
reforms may prove to be overly ambitious, or 
their implementation may have to be spread 
over time (for example, this concerns plans to 
increase defence spending and the number of 
troops in Lithuania and Latvia), with regard also 
to the electoral cycle. Nonetheless, the Russian 
aggression in Ukraine has contributed to a boost 
in defence investments in the Baltic states. Lith-
uania, Latvia and Estonia at present have the 
political will to systematically develop their mil-
itary potentials, and there is also rising public 
interest in state security issues (which has been 
manifesting itself in the expansion of the vol-
unteer territorial defence forces, among other 
phenomena). The changes currently observed 
in the armed forces of the Baltic states will be 
persistent, at least within the timeframe of the 
coming decade, even if the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict deescalates.
APPENDIX 1
Armed forces of the Baltic states (2014)
Lithuania Latvia Estonia
Armed forces Professional
Professional soldiers – 7900
Active reserve (TDF) – 3800
Professional
Professional soldiers – 5310
Active reserve (TDF) – 7850
Conscription with professional 
component 
Conscripts – 2500
Professional soldiers – 3250
Active reserve (TDF) – 14,800
Land forces 3500 soldiers 3850 soldiers 5300 soldiers
Navy 600 soldiers 550 soldiers 200 soldiers
Air force 1000 soldiers 310 soldiers 250 soldiers
Other Special forces (n.d.),
Territorial defence forces as 
part of the land forces
(4500 members including 
700 permanent professional 
personnel)
Special forces (n.d.),
Territorial defence forces (8450 
members including 600 perma-
nent professional personnel)
Territorial defence forces
(14,800 members)
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APPENDIX 2
Military expenditures in the Baltic states in the years 2014–2016 (% of GDP and nominal value 
in US$ millions and € millions) according to SIPRI and figures from the Defence Ministries
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Lithuania
% of GDP
US$ million
1,2%
418
1,2%
455
1,2%
504
1,1%
550
1,1%
567
1,1%
428
0,9%
357
0,8%
345
0,8%
345
0,8%
357
0,8%
378
1,1% 
425*
b.d.
574*
Latvia
% of GDP
US$ million
1,7%
382
1,7%
444
1,9%
559
1,7%
609
1,7%
597
1,4%
379
1,1%
287
1,0%
297
0,9%
273
0,9%
293
0,9%
307
1%
254*
1,4%
322*
Estonia
% of GDP
US$ million
1,7%
317
1,9%
395
1,9%
444
2,1%
538
2,1%
519
2,3%
470
1,8%
366
1,7%
389
2,0%
455
2%
470
2%
496
2,05%
412*
2,07%
449*
Lithuania Latvia Estonia
Tanks - - 3 × T-55 (training) -
Armoured 
vehicles
- 126 × M113A1
- 4 × M113 (recovery)
- 8 × MT-LB (engineering)  
- 8 × Cougar (on lease from the 
USA)
- 56 x XA-180 Sisu
- 40 x XA-188 Sisu
- 21 x BTR-80
- 7 x Mamba
Anti-tank 
weapons
- Javelin anti-tank guided 
missiles (n.d., 10 mounted on 
all-terrain vehicles)
- Carl Gustav recoilless rifles 
(n.d.)
- Spike long range anti-tank 
guided missiles (n.d.)
- Carl Gustav recoilless rifles 
(n.d.)
- 130 × anti-tank cannon 
(90 mm)
- Milan anti-tank guided missiles 
(n.d.)
- IMI MAPATS anti-tank guided 
missiles (n.d.)
- Carl Gustav recoilless rifles 
(n.d.)
- 130 × Pvpj 1110 recoilless rifle
- 30 × M40 recoilless rifle
Anti-aircraft 
weapons
- man-portable air-defence 
systems (Stinger and RBS-70) 
(n.d.)
- RBS-70 man-portable air-de-
fence systems (n.d.)
- 24 × L/70 anti-aircraft cannon 
(40 mm)
- Mistral man-portable 
air-defence systems (n.d.)
Artillery - 18 × M101 howitzer (105 mm)
- 5 × 2B11 mortar (120 mm)
- 10 × M/41D mortar (120 mm)
- 15 × Krh/40 mortar (on 
M113A1)
- 23 × K-53 field cannon 
(100 mm)
- 28 × L-16 mortar (81 mm)
- 25 × M120 mortar (120 mm)
- 42 × D-30 howitzer (122 mm)
- 24 × FH-70 howitzer (155 mm)
- 41 × B455 mortar (81 mm)
- 10 × NM95 mortar (81 mm)
- 80 × M252 mortar (81 mm)
- 14 × 2B11 mortar (120 mm)
- 165 × M/41D mortar (120 mm)
Mine warfare 
vessels
4 6 4
Patrol vessels 4 5 1
Support vessels 4 2 -
Aircraft - 3 × C-27J transport aircraft
- 2 × L-410 transport aircraft
- 1 × L-39ZA training aircraft
4 × An-2 transport aircraft 2 × An-2 transport aircraft
Helicopters 8 × SAR Mi-8 transport 
helicopter
- 4 × Mi-17 multi-task helicopter
- 2 × PZL Mi-2 transport 
helicopter
4 × R-44 transport helicopter
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